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Commentators discuss exiting Afghanistan following an international conference on Afghanistan where a 2014 target date was agreed for Afghans to take over their own security.

[subscription required] that Western policy makers had a stark choice and most are deciding they don't want to be in for the long haul:

"What was once a 40-strong multinational effort born out of international outrage over the attacks of September 11 2001 has become an American-dominated operation with a fast-disappearing supporting cast. The Netherlands and Canada, both substantial troop-contributing nations in the restive southern provinces, are both pulling out in the next 12 months. The new British coalition government is an uneasy mix of those who are steadfast in their commitment and those who are committed to an early exit...
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"Now is time to decide which course to follow: Change the way things are run in Afghanistan for good, or get out."

The president of the Council on Foreign Relations that their not winning so Afghanistan is not worth it:

"Afghanistan is claiming too many American lives, requiring too much attention, and absorbing too many resources. The sooner we accept that Afghanistan is less a problem to be fixed than a situation to be managed, the better."

that it is possible for the US and UK to exit without admitting defeat:

"Britain and the US will want two things. First, the opportunity to argue that the lives lost and money spent since 2001 have not been wasted, and second, some assurance that al-Qaida will not return. In the UK a new government has scope to change policy, but in the US there will be great sensitivity to any suggestion that the administration has failed to atone for 9/11. Talking to the Taliban is acceptable to US voters, but only if done from a position of strength.
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"However, it is perfectly reasonable for Nato to declare victory. The aim of the Afghan campaign has always been to defeat al-Qaida and al-Qaida is now barely present. The Taliban insist they have no intention of interfering with the security of any other nation. There seems every reason to put them to the test."

The that no-one at the conference pointed out the compromises involved in leaving Afghanistan:

"Their idea is to trade legitimacy for stability, so as to allow their own troops to go home. The most hard-nosed realists, including some of the diplomats sitting behind their foreign-minister bosses, say that extraordinary compromises will have to be made, particularly on women's rights. Perhaps even the country's territory would have to be traded away: the south handed to the Taliban, the north to a grizzly collection of old warlords, with only a token national government left in Kabul."

The
[subscription required] criticism of the decision should be put in perspective:

"The implications of the new policy, however, are far from subtle. It is inevitable that the shift will be seized upon by our enemies as evidence that we are cutting and running. It should be remembered that if we chose to stay, it would be seized upon as an attempt to impose an empire and suppress its people. We cannot have our strategy dictated by their propaganda."

The Western governments not to let go of control of aid to Afghanistan:

"He heads the most corrupt regime on the planet: a sickening proportion of the £24 billion in aid that has poured in since 2001 has been siphoned off by politicians and officials, much of it - we learned last week - fuelling a property boom in Dubai. Mr Karzai's request for even more money to be channelled through the government should have been given short shrift, for his latest pledge to root out corruption is, quite simply, worthless.
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"A more creative use of aid - despite our debt crisis, this country is unfathomably increasing its own contribution by 40 per cent - would be to direct some of it to those Pashtun tribal leaders willing to resist the Taliban."

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