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Commentators discuss President Barack Obama's speech on intervention in Libya.

• Watch the speech in full

The the timing of the speech:

"President Obama made the right, albeit belated, decision to join with allies and try to stop Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi from slaughtering thousands of Libyans. But he has been far too slow to explain that decision, or his long-term strategy, to Congress and the American people...
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"To his credit, Mr. Obama did not sugarcoat the difficulties ahead. While he suggested that his goal, ultimately, is to see Colonel Qaddafi gone, he also said that the air war was unlikely to accomplish that by itself."

the speech powerful but incomplete, leaving it unclear what the strategy to get rid of Col Gaddafi is:

"What does 'assist the opposition' mean? Money? Training? Arms? A robust embargo against Gaddafi and his henchmen? Kind words? So far, America hasn't seemed enthusiastic about much beyond the last two.
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"The 'time and space' that the coalition is providing the Libyan rebels are the results of a large coalition effort; will the varied nations involved be able to sustain it as Gaddafi 'tries desperately to hang on to power'? Or will America have to decide whether it can shoulder more of the cost when others lose interest?"

there are some contradictions in President Obama's thinking:

"The most obvious question is how Obama can reconcile his stated desire to see Muammar Qaddafi leave office with his insistence that our military actions are not designed to foment regime change in Libya. Obama's attempt to resolve this contradiction was his statement that he intended to usher Qaddafi out of power via 'non-military means.' In part, Obama seemed to be reassuring the American people that there would be no U.S. ground troops in Libya - a position with which we agree. But was he also foreclosing the possibility that NATO might continue to use its airpower to aid the rebels in their advance toward Tripoli? If so, why? And how does this square with the fact that we currently appear to be waging, in the description of The New York Times, 'an all-out assault on Libya's military'?
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"Would it not be in our interest to see the rebels victorious? And if we can help them to achieve this from the air, why should we demur?"

that there was a vital element missing:

"The president talked plainly and persuasively about the inputs and why he ordered them. But he avoided talking about outcomes. He said the administration has 'fulfilled the pledge' it made to the American people. And he reiterated the point 'So for those who doubted our capacity to carry out this operation, I want to be clear: the United States of America has done what we said we would do.' (Note to research assistants: who in the world doubted the U.S. capacity? I heard many doubts about will, but I can't imagine there is anyone who has even the faintest familiarity with American military power who doubted our capacity to do what we have done, namely establish air supremacy over Libya and conduct precision strikes against vehicles.) But these are all the inputs. He is right to note that we deserve credit for delivering on the inputs, but strategy is about accomplishing outcomes. No one expects the outcomes to be achieved already, but I did expect more discussion about what outcomes the military must achieve for him to declare mission accomplished."

why the goals may be obscured:

"What else have we learned? To cut to the chase, according to the president, we learned to keep our goals more modest than regime change. This was, for me, the most powerful and direct part of tonight's speech: where he said openly and plainly that the goal of this exercise was not to oust Muammar Gaddafi. 'To be blunt,' he said, 'we went down that road in Iraq.' It took eight years and cost 5,000 American lives - and many tens of thousands more Iraqi lives. Regime change isn't our job. But this could be a hard sell, in no small part because of the way both his political foes and the media tend to simplify things: if Gaddafi is still in there, Mr President, doesn't that mean you've failed?"

the wider context and predicts this intervention is the last of its kind:

"But the reality is that the Libyan war is more likely to mark a last hurrah for liberal interventionism than a new dawn. For the brutal truth is that the western powers that are the keenest promoters of the idea will not have the economic strength or the public backing to sustain many more overseas interventions. And the rising economic powers - China, India, Brazil and others - are deeply sceptical about the whole concept.
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"Britain, France and the US all voted in favour of the UN resolution authorising force in Libya. But the fashionable grouping known as the Brics - Brazil, Russia, India and China - all abstained. None of them have much time for Colonel Gaddafi. But countries like China, India and Brazil see little to gain, and much to lose, by risking money, men and influence in foreign interventions. Their instinct is to mind their own business and to concentrate on the long-term goal of building up their own economic strength. A massacre in Libya might be unfortunate, no doubt - but Benghazi is a long way from Beijing or Brasilia."