Thursday 27 Nov 2014
The father of one of five British soldiers shot dead by a "rogue" Afghan policeman last year has said the incident might not have happened if the troops had had more handguns.
Adrian Major, whose son Jimmy, 18, was killed in the incident in Helmand province last November, says he was told by an Army representative that it was too expensive to provide all soldiers with pistols.
The troops from the Grenadier Guards and the Royal Military Police had been mentoring a squad of the Afghan National Police and had just returned from a morning patrol.
Once inside their defended compound, they had put down their main weapons and removed their body armour and were relaxing when one of the Afghan policemen, known as Gulbuddin, opened fire at close range.
Mr Major has told the ³ÉÈËÂÛ̳'s File On 4 programme that his son and his colleagues had little chance to defend themselves: "Out of 16 only 3 had small arms. And we were told that they couldn't afford to give them all a side arm.
He continues: "If I'd known I'd have bought him a side arm myself. If they'd had side arms and body armour on I don't think he'd have done it because it was an ideal opportunity with them all sat round and relaxed. He just took advantage of them."
File On 4 has learned that the official investigation into the killings has looked at ways of enabling all coalition soldiers to carry pistols, with priority given to those partnering Afghan forces. It's understood extra pistols have been bought and sent to Afghanistan.
In a statement the Ministry of Defence says: "This is absolutely not an issue of cost – not all British troops routinely carry side arms.
"There are enough side arms in theatre, should individuals require them and they will be carried if individuals are trained to do so and their roles require it."
File On 4 has also learned that the Gulbuddin should not have even been at the police post.
He had been employed unofficially by the local police commander, who is now under arrest. The Taliban subsequently claimed it had carried out the attack.
Mr Major says his son had told him that he and his colleagues had been concerned that they could not verify the identities of some of the police they were working alongside.
He says: "We were told that the police were coming and going and they didn't know who would turn up on particular days. There was no record of who was turning up – and no identity of anybody on the Afghan side.
"There were supposed to be 10 policemen but some days three would turn up, some days five would turn up and some days 12 would turn up," he adds.
A former senior UN official has also spoken of his concern that the Taliban has infiltrated the Afghan police and army.
Antonio Maria Costa, who was Executive Director of the UN's Office of Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan until August, tells File On 4: "We have plenty of evidence we had a number of suicide attacks carried out by people who had been trusted because they were affiliated to either the army or the police.
"Certainly there are sleeping cells, certainly there are individuals who are waiting for instruction to hit and that is one of the biggest problems, which we have seen in Afghanistan as of late. There is fear that a very large number of insurgents could have been infiltrated, by the way not only the Army and the Police, also in other parts of the government establishment in that country."
However Lieutenant General Nick Parker, Deputy Commander of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, says the issue of Taliban infiltration had to be put into perspective.
"There have been some very unfortunate incidents but in a force this size it is probably inevitable that that sort of thing will occur on rare occasions," he says.
He adds: "My view, this is something we must watch very carefully. It is not widespread and what we've got to do is continue to partner effectively with security forces out on the front line."
Any use of information in this press release must credit File On 4, Tuesday 5 October, Radio 4, 8pm.
FS
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