Do animals really matter?
Something approaching a debate on food ethics is breaking out in various comments on our discussion of foie gras. Stephen G has name-checked the distinguished Australian philosopher who is currently a professor of bioethics at Princeton. I'm glad to see Singer's name enter the fray here because his ideas merit very serious consideration by anyone interested in these matters.
Singer's book, , first published in 1975 but updated since then, is sometimes called "the Bible of the animal welfare movement". The underlying moral principle defended and developed in that work is devastatingly simple, and Singer is careful to acknowledge that he is not the first to propose it (it goes back to 1892 book, Animal Rights). Animal Liberation began as an essay in The New York Review of Books in 1973. See for Singer's reflections on how the landscape of the animal rights movement has changed since then.)
Singer summarises the philosophical view he defends there as follows:
Species is, in itself, as irrelevant to moral status as race or sex. Hence all beings with interests are entitled to equal consideration: that is, we should not give their interests any less consideration that we give to the similar interests of members of our own species. Taken seriously, this conclusion requires radical changes in almost every interaction we have with animals, including our diet, our economy, and our relations with the natural environment.
The fuller ethical implications of that view are explored in a subsequent work, , first published in 1979 (second edition 1993). In 2001, he also pursued a fascinating , published in Slate magazine, with the legal philosopher and judge Richard Posner on whether human beings have an ethical obligations to animals.
Singer's conclusion, of course, is that animals (and all sentient beings) do matter -- in the fullest moral sense -- and that human beings do not have a free hand, ethically speaking, to use and abuse animals as they see fit. This view seems obvious to most people today (whether they are vegetarians or carnivores), but it was not always so. In the 13th century, argued that human beings have no moral obligations whatsoever in respect of animals: animals, he said, have merely a utility value and no intrinsic value: God created animals for humans and we are, thus, free to use the for food, clothing, sport, or any other purpose we choose. One doesn't have to be a , like Singer, to recognise that Thomas's argument is difficult to defend today.
Comments
One doesn't have to be a utilitarian to criticse the position of Aquinas - no, obviously not. But, surely one must be able to provide some ethical theory on which one bases ones moral judgments. In the other post on foie gras (which for some reason doesn't display the last 4 comments on my machine) I mentioned I was almost persuaded to vegetarianism by reading Singers book (3 times). The reason I "back slid" was that Singer's presuppositions simply aren't rigourously argued for. Admittedly if his presuppositions are right I think his argument follows. But, I don't see why I should accept them. I was in awe at how he argued FROM them - but not at how he argued FOR them. Remember also that the same ethical theory on which he defends vegetarianism he also defends the moral justifiably of killing of severely mentally disabled people - and children - up to the age of 2, if I remember correctly.
So, yay! Save the animals, kill the mentally retarded. I reckon as many people find this distasteful as the views of Aquinas.
SG
It has been said that the quality of a civilization lies in part in how it treats its convicted criminals. To this could be added another criterion: how does it treat its animals, regardless of whether it acccepts vegetarianism or not? And human beings are defined both by what they have to do and by what they freely wish to do or refrain from doing. An animal is unsentimental about what it preys on because that is its nature.
I do have a view with regards to animals. As a child in the 1960's and 1970's, my best friend was my dog. If I had not married and started a family, I probably would have found refuge in a dog because with the ways humans destroy the world, I prefer to be with animals [the only human exception would be having my computer or radio tuned to the 成人论坛.]
Nice piece on Singer. I hope people will follow up on his ideas. I don't agree with him on many points; but then I don't agree with most philosophers on most things. Stephen G - you can learn from Singer on animal welfare without agreeing with his controversial views on infanticide. Singer is widely regarded as the most influential public philosopher in the world today, and for good reason. I'm not sure which presuppositions Stephen G has in mind when he says Singer fails to argue for them rigorously enough for his liking. Perhaps he would tell us?
On the other hand, with ethical arguments, it's always the case that some moral assumptions are in dispute. The point of the argument is to draw those who agree with those assumptions to the next stage in the logic of the argument. I know of few ethicists who have written quite as much about underlying moral assumptions; so I await Stephen G's reply with interest. Maybe a fourth reading of Practical Ethics could be round the corner, Stephen?
I love it when a great thinker like Singer is disparaged by comments from someone who probably hasn't even got a degree in philosophy!
Stephen's political argument is worth knocking on the head. He thinks that foie gras shouldn't be banned because that ban rests on the idea that anything that is immoral should be made illegal as well.
I agree with Stephen G that this is a daft principle. There are many things I regard as immoral in the behaviour of others (and some will find some of my lifestyle immoral too) but I don't want to make those choices by others illegal. That way leads to the Taliban. No thanks.
But where I disagree with Stephen G is here. I think foie gras should be illegal because it causes harm to animals. That's a different matter entirely. I also think smoking in pubs and restarants should be banned -not because I regard smoking as immoral (in fact, I'm an occasional smoker myself), but because I want to protect other people from the harm they have not chosen.
Pauly- What was Einstein's degree when he made the postulates of special relativity? And Stephen isn't disparaging, he's disagreeing. Singer is of course a great thinker, and as such he would take exception to your remarks which suggest that only those with degrees in philosophy can debate his ideas. (By the way, Stephen's BTh isn't entirely unrelated.)
Jan- I'd encourage you to think a little more about the principal you're using to decide whether something is legal or illegal. You say that you think foie gras should be illegal because it causes harm to animals. Beef, chicken, pork and lobster are all examples of meat produced by animal slaughter - I'm sure we'd all agree that slaughter qualifies as "causing harm to animals". By your logic, the sale of all meat should be illegal.
Thanks John for your comment. Let me be clearer. I think it is possible to slaughter animals for human consumption in a way that is humane. Those processes should be legal. The inhumane slaughter of animals should be - and is - illegal in the UK. I support that distinction. Foie gras is produced by an inhumane process. Surely you aren't arguing that people should have the freedom in law to hurt or kill animals in anyway they see fit?
John asks what was Einstein's degree when he proposed special relativity.
He was a science and maths graduate of Zurich's Federal Polytechnic Institute and held a PhD from the University of Zurich in theoretical physics (1905). Einstein's famous papers on special relativity, Brownian motion, and the photoelectric effect were submitted for publication that same year.
Your point is?
Pauly- 1905??? By then, Einstein was 26 years old! Einstein's Mirror and much other formative thought with regard to the speed of light and other issues relevant to special relativity came up WAY before that. My point is that good ideas are not dependent upon having a degree in the subject as you imply. But I can see you aren't receptive to anything I have to say... so I'm finished with you. :-)
Jan- I appreciate your reply, and agree that there are humane and inhumane ways to slaughter animals. Much of the debate necessarily centers upon whether meat-eaters can ethically defend their diet while still agreeing that animal torture is wrong. Let's not forget that, in the absence of such a defence, not only meat but also leather couches and shoes are out of the question.
David: In Singer's first chapter he makes a number of assumptions about the nature of morality generally. Singer himself describes it as a tentative defence of utilitarianism and makes no claim to rigour, nor does he tackle counter objections to his utilitarian position in any depth at all. It leaves a lot of questions unanswered - too many for my mind. Perhaps he does better in other work - you could let me know so I can read it, I'd be very interested in it.
Pauly: No. You got me. I've no degree in philosophy. Shoot! Now I can't have an opinion! You're a genius.
Jan: at last, something worth engaging with...thank you for that. Anyhow...I agree with John on this one - it's a bit difficult to defend meat-eating at all on your view. I'm not convinced you've made a good argument for that. Yes, you think reducing suffering is the key - but the fact of the matter is that there are many cases in which there is some degree of suffering. How much is an acceptable amount and why?
Just curious.
That's all for now folks...I've got a tired pregnant wife to look after here so gotta run...
SG
Jan: Killing an animal for food isn't harming it?
Stegosaurus (!): If death is a form of suffering and it's wrong to cause suffering to animals, then everyone should be vegetarian.
But I don't think death is a form of suffering. The process leading to death may or may not involve suffering.
John, stop moving the goal posts. You asked what degrees Einstein had when he made the postulates of Special Relativity. He proposed special relativity in 1905. Check it out in my url (a wiki link). No need to re-write history. If you think he made the postulates at some other time, what are you suggesting?
John asks the right question: can meat-eaters defend their diet while accepting that torturing animals is wrong?
What's your answer, John? I don't think it's possible to square that particular circle, but you may have an argument.
Stephen, I'd like to hear the moral argument you defend in support of meat-eating. You are right, I think, to raise some questions with the consistency of Jan's position. She tries to defend meat-eating while opposing the unnecessary abuse of animals. As I understand your view, you wish to defend meat-eating as well, but without falling into any utilitarian views. What's your argument?
OK Guys away from qualifications (the arguments stand or fall by themselves, not who said them) and back to the debate
For me the important passage in the original quote is
'all beings with interests are entitled to equal consideration'
and, to me, the interesting words are 'with interests' this seems to me to be a justification of a line on a graduated scale. At one end are the buddhist monks who brush the floor gently before them and wear masks so that no creature is killed (quite how they control their own immune systems yet continue to survive is beyond me). At the other end are, what? mercenaries, exceutioners (certain politicians?)
To me, he, and Aquinas have taken an arbitary points on the continuum (those of utility or interest) and drawn their lines there. Why not reproductive ability, intelligence, good looks, ability to play the rolf harris stylophone or produce the most bacon?
I know the argument of absolutes is easy, but i what i am asking for is to jutify why one position is preferable/ better/ more logical than another.
Pauly- Because you appear to have misunderstood me, I'll respond to you one more time. I was not referring to Einstein's annus mirabilis in 1905, I was talking about the series of events that shaped his views on special relativity prior to his series of papers in 1905 and prior to him having a degree, which he didn't recieve until 1900. Why would I set myself up to be defeated by you on a purely historical technicality?
It was a fairly simple point, Pauly, a point that few would agree with you on: one doesn't need a degree in the subject to challenge and debate in the arena of ideas.
John: Pauly's comment is a bit amateurish - even childish - You're wasting your time. I'd be amazed if he has a philosophy degree either with a thoughtless comment like that.
Jan: Are human deaths OK as long as they don't involve suffering? If not why should animal death be different? And, since there is certainly some degree of suffering in most meat production - how much is too much, and do you check with your butcher before hand?
Columbas: I'll be honest that my views are in flux right now - but, if there is no good argument for vegetarianism then I'll continue to eat meat. Sorry for the brief reply, but I'm in a hurry this morning and have a big day ahead of me.
SG
Columbus: I鈥檝e got a little time so, here鈥檚 a fuller answer.
There are many variants of utilitarianism, and utilitarianism is but one member of the wider consequentialist family, which in turn is only one of many broad ethical theories. I used to ascribe to a broadly consequentialist ethic, but I no longer think that such an ethic can actually be sustained in practice (Peter Singer鈥檚 Practical Ethics is anything but practical).
I think that perhaps my morals tend towards what could be described as 鈥渆goism.鈥 In our moral judgments we make decisions about value and value requires a valuer 鈥 and thus is a personal matter. What you value will differ from what I value. For instance: if I ever have to choose between saving my wife鈥檚 life and saving the lives of both Pauly and Jan I would certainly, unhesitatingly, save my wife鈥檚 life (no offence intended by this). Under utilitarian systems such a choice would most certainly be immoral. But, should I be castigated for it? How many human beings wouldn鈥檛 choose the same thing in my shoes? Is not my choice fully understandable, and, indeed, fully human? My wife鈥檚 life means much more to me than the lives of two strangers. I don鈥檛 think Singer鈥檚 ethics would allow him to act like me in such an instance, but would he not act that way? Really?
I love human kind. I marvel also at the animal world 鈥 but I value the former so much more. Humans matter a great deal more to me than animals. I can empathise with fellow human beings, feel their pain, laugh with them, form meaningful relationships and attachments to them, and mourn their passing. I just can鈥檛 do this with animals (although some people might claim that they can). Their minds are beyond the reach of mine, their experiences alien. I have a bond with other humans that I just don鈥檛 share with animals. But animals do have value in a degree. They are valuable to me because of their flesh. I enjoy eating meat and don鈥檛 feel bad for the animals who must die to provide it. Their lives have little other value to me.
This isn鈥檛 a 鈥渘ice鈥 view to many people, but that only means they value differently from me. And, to my mind, this view is much more consistent than meat-eaters like Jan who want to have their meat and save it, and who really should be veggie if she took her arguments here to a logical conclusion.
SG
Stephen G:
Singer describes himself as a "preference utilitarian", and I think he does a good job across a score of books defending that perspective in applied contexts. I take a consequentialist view of moral matters, myself. Yes, there sre some problems with that meta-ethic, but there are problems with all ethical theories. You pays your money and you takes your pick. For my money, consequentialism does the best job around.
I'm not surprised to hear that you are an egoist - that's a position upheld by man libertarians (including Ayn Rand), and you have described yourself as a libertarian. Clearly those with a Christian approach to ethics could not defend eogism as a perspective, but I haven't detected a Christian approach in your statements here, so I assume that you are of an atheistic perspective (correct me if I am wrong).
I confess that I've never me a philosophical egoist in the flesh. How do you make sense of sacrificial altruism from your perspective? And how do you deal with obvious case studies which apparently threaten your view: e.g., an egoist who rapes and kills others in order to satisfy his pleasure (clearly illegal acts, but from your point of view they are as "moral" as any other self-directed action)?
ETHICAL EGOISM: Doesn't this mark the end of any ethical conversation? Once someone says, I am an egoist, it doesn't make any sense to ask them to defend their views with arguments. The point of arguments is to persuade others. If I am an ethical egoist, I don't need to formulate an argument for anything; I simply need to say, This is what I want. It's about maximising the greatest happiness for the least number (namely, oneself).
Columbus鈥hanks for your reply. Singer does a marvellous job of applying his ethical theory - but to me his position is lacking in the foundations for which he never spends enough time arguing for. In practical ethics he admits to stating it as little more than his assumptions, and as a tentative argument at best. Consequentialism is a persuasive theory, no doubt. But it鈥檚 difficult to put in to practice. What form of consequentialist are you?
It my surprise you to learn that I count myself as a 鈥淐hristian theist鈥 - not an atheist and I don鈥檛 find egoism to be incompatible with Christianity - prima facie it certainly is, I guess, but not necessarily. This would take a long time to explain, so I鈥檓 going to skip it for now so as to try to stay on point. Egoism is indeed held by many libertarians (incidentally, Ayn Rand never referred to herself as a libertarian. She was 鈥淥bjectivist鈥). I've found it rational and persuasive, and is why I currently lean towards it.
You ask how I make sense of sacrificial altruism? Is this an example of what you mean: would I take a bullet for my wife? Yes, I would. As an egoist I certainly would. I couldn鈥檛 live with myself if I let my wife, who I love, die when I could have prevented it. This is compatible with egoism. As with Christianity it is true that prima facie this isn鈥檛 the case, but digging a bit deeper I think it is.
You ask about a rapist. A rapist who kills would be a criminal in a libertarian society and rightly imprisoned or put to death for an infringement of another persons fundamental rights. Egoists can still denounce this behaviour can they not? A rapist should not behave in that way. It鈥檚 disgusting. To see a fellow human being treated badly is an affront to anyone who loves humanity. Incidentally, as a consequentialist you might have problems here. What if a mafia gang threatened to kill your family if you didn鈥檛 rape someone. When you then rape a woman you have saved the lives of your family. Was your rape moral? As a consequentialist you would probably have to admit that not only was it moral, but morally obligatory to rape the woman.
Helenica: No, there is plenty of room for reason. Many of the things I say in defence of egoism can be disputed and reasoned with. Perhaps you can argue with my consistency on the matter, or even factual accuracy. Moreover, I am still open to being convinced if you have a better theory to put forward. Feel free so I can take a peek into your moral soul. I promise not to mess things up too much :)
SG
Sorry, should have added this: egoism is not the END of ethical debate. It's the BEGINNING. To go further requires argument. So, let argument commence! Persuade me!
SG
Stephen you don't sound too sure of yourself.... yet you have a blog in which you try to convince others of your position?
Quience, I agree entirely. What a very strange position for Stephen G to adopt - and then to regard it as a position that encourages ethical debate! Egoism is such a curious stance that the onus is rather on its defenders to make a case for it.
Queince: I'm as sure as I believe people can or should be about any moral theory. I write a blog because I'm convinced libertarianism is the correct political philosophy. I'm not as certain about egoism, grant you that, but libertarianism isn't the same thing.
David: Isn't the onus on anyone making moral claims to defend them? What is your ethical theory? I'm astounded that so few people here have the backbone to come clean about their own beliefs. At least I've done that much, despite being vulnerable on the point. How about you?
Why shouldn't egoism encourage debate? It's a moral position. It makes moral claims. There's nothing in any of my comments that cannot be rationally challenged. Egoism is a more "minimal" view than other ethics. As an individual I begin with myself and what has value to me. In order to bring me further YOU need to provide ME with good reason. Until you provide me with YOUR ethical outlook I'm not sure that we can have an open and honest debate. Why are you shy about the matter? Nothing to hide do you? I'm willing to be corrected and I'm not going to feel shame at being proven wrong - that's why I spill my guts about my beliefs even if I'm not 100% Sell me your theory, if there is indeed anything of value in it :)
SG
Stephen - David (Oxford) has a point. For days, you have been making pronouncements about ethical theories and arguments, and adopting and anything goes attitude about how we should treat animals. It's perfectly reasonably that someone should ask you to state your ethical reasoning. It seems clear that you are making ethical statements without much by may of a basis for your views. It's a simple request: answer the criticisms you've receieved about egoism and tell us why you hold that view. Personally, I regard it as a naive and childish ethical view - it amounts to saying, "I want it, so I'll have it, whatever the cost to anyone else."
Hi Jan ...Thanks for your comments, although you have failed to answer the questions I asked of you earlier in comment 19. My basic reasoning for egoism is in my comment 20, as yet I haven't received any proper criticism of that view, and you seem to manage nothing other than than "naive" and "childish." Pardon me if I pay little or no attention to such criticism.
And, please give me YOUR alternative and YOUR reasoning. No one else on this entire board seems willing to actually state their moral foundations. I'm not asking for a full philosophical treatise - it's a comment board for crying out loud. Just let me know what your foundations are - if you have any.
In addition to comments already made in defence of egoism I can add that egoism is realist - natural to humanity. We are all individuals who value different things. I am not a sacrificial animal to be disposed of in the name of some greater collective ethic. I suspect far more people are egoists than care to admit - since "altruism" is worn as a badge of honour these days. Every day you and I and everyone lives and acts along egoist lines.
By way of a thought experiment: take my above example about saving my wife's life. If I have the choice to make to save my wife's life and saving you and David, am I wrong to save my wife? I don't think I am. My wife's life has more value to me. Why should I put your lives before the life of my wife? Would you choose to save me and my wife instead of your partner if given the choice? I'm not expecting an honest answer here - just ask yourself the question and try to be honest with yourself. I think most normal and rational people would put their close friends and family before others - and RIGHTLY so. Who would condemn them for it?
In the meantime I await - stupidly hopeful - that someone other than me will lay down their moral foundations for analysis. Give me an alternative. Why should I adopt a different ethical viewpoint?
SG
Hi Stephen. If I had to choose between saving my own life and saving you, your wife and children, I hope would have the courage to sacrifice my own life. If didn't, and allowed your family to die, I would regard myself as having acted selfishly and wrongly. I'm not a utilitarian; I'm a Christian. That's an ethical perspective too - and an ethic with a long tradition. You ask important questions about moral thought.
Hi Marcus...thanks for your comments...I'd just like to know WHY you would save me and my family whilst sacrificing your own life. Incidentally, I don't see such a decision as necessarily un-egoist. Would your decision be born out of religious duty? In which case, your act could still be egoist - you are saving me and my family to fulfill YOUR duty and, ultimately, receive a heavenly reward. Is that selfish? Is selfishness necessarily bad?
SG
Stephen- You are of course quite right that egoism more accurately defines many human behaviours than many other ethical positions. You're even more on point when you say that altruism is worn as a badge of honour: people instinctively applaud unselfish action while condemning selfish action without thinking through the ethical principals informing each, or about why their reactions are so self-evidently correct.
Take this simple ethical question, to be answered by those who disagree with you: if a grenade is about to explode, and you could save the life of your fellow human being by throwing yourself onto the grenade in self-sacrifice, why would it be unethical to turn and run from it to save your own life instead?
I would encourage people to read Ayn Rand, who has been namechecked here a few times, for her utterly persuasive writing on this subject.
Stephen, you misunderstand me. I would not save you and your family at the cost of my own life because I am hoping for a place in heaven. That would be an appalling abuse of God's common sense. I wouldn't save you in order to save myself. I would save you because you are a human being, intrinsically valuable - and I couldn't life with myself if I let you and your family die. Christian faith is not about following duties; nor is it about savig your own neck, in this life or the next.
Do people really still read Ayn Rand? Her writings were extremely popular in the US n the 1980s, but have never been taken terribly seriously by critics and philosophers. The Fountainhead did become a terrific Hollywood movie, but Rand's objectivism, upon consideration, is a fairly vacuous attempt at moral philosophy. Robert Nozick, the Harvard philosopher, was concerned that other philosophers hadn't given Rand a fair crack of the whip and decided to write an article examinging her sustantive philosophy. This really did hammer the nail into her coffen. There are good reasons why Ayn Rand is not taught in serious philosophy courses; those reasons are best laid out in Nozick's paper, "On the Randian Argument," which demonstrates that her moral proposals are conceptually flawed. Incidentally, libertarianism should not be equated with Rand - there is much to be said for libertarianism and it can be defended without recourse to an outmoded and flawed perspective such as objectivism.
David (Oxford)- Your use of the word 'vacuous' to describe Rand's philosophy is curious. Nevertheless I don't defend libertarianism using Rand because there's no other way to defend libertarianism: as you point out, it can be defended without appeal to Rand's egoism (which no-one here has even attempted to begin to refute). You mention Nozick. Have you read Anarchy, State & Utopia? I have, several times, and I find Nozick to be utterly compatible with Rand on his theoretical premises (despite what he may have gone on to write later. As you will no doubt agree, the arguments stand or fall by themselves, not with any regard ad hominem).
Of course you're entitled to your opinion on Rand, which I respect. But there are many out here who (still!) disagree with you. (Incidentally, I'm glad you mentioned Nozick, whose contribution to libertarian ideals I appreciate more than Rand's, who didn't equate her philosophy with libertarianism herself).
Marcus- Amusingly, you've just given us a well-hashed out argument for 'psychological egoism' and proved Stephen's point! You say that you would save Stephen's life because you "could not live with" yourself if you let him die. Thus you are saying that the motive for your action is not altruistic but rather egoist, in that your regard was for yourself by saving Stephen. As far as I can see, the debate is over: you live by egoist ethics! :-)
To Marcus: Yeah, what John said.
To David: I'm still waiting on your ethical theory.
SG
Marcus: Forgive me, I failed to adequately reply. You say you would save me because I am "intrinsically valuable" - but, aren't YOU also intrinsically valuable on your view? Why then would you save ME and YOUR expense?
SG
Yes John, I've read a great deal of Nozick. You should take a look at his objections to Rand, though; not much left of her when he's finished. Like you, I admire him greatly.
A word on your statement of egoism. The validity or good sense of a position depends to a great deal on how the position is stated.
Here are a couple of possible statements:
(1) We always act on our own desires.
(2) we always act on desires for our own well-being
Which of these are you supporting? The first statement, it seems to me, is absolutely true. No-one would deny it, I think. It's in fact "trivially true"; that is, it doesn't add up to a hill of beans. It certainly doesn't add up to a moral theory worth taking seriously. Let's just accept that it's a statement of fact, much like "Water is H2o" or "All batchelors are unmarried men". Nothing much follows from statements of that kind. But it would be a pretty odd world if they weren't true.
Ok, onto the alternative statement (2) This does amount to an interesting claim, and if it were true I think it would be a truth we'd all have to seriously and deeply grapple with. And it's a truth that SHOULD inform whatever ethical theory one proposes to adopt. But it seems to me that (2) is clearly false. Self-destructive action of many kinds (from altruism to suicide) exist and that's just a fact about the world.
Perhaps you can state an alternative version of psychological egoism that avoids the pitfalls of (1) and (2). If so, don't publish your version on Will's blog (as much as I enjoy it!). Instead, you will have made your name in contemporary philosophy, so I recommend that you write a book and become a Harvard philosophy professor like Nozick. Speaking of which, I've more work to do on a paper here! Nice chatting to you.
A quote from the Guardian obit of Robert Nozick:
"In later life, Nozick renounced extreme libertarianism, and even proposed some scheme for checks on unlimited inheritance. He said he had wanted to develop a theory of human nature and ethics to bolt on to his political theory and ground his notion of rights, but had failed."
Sounds like great ethical system to me.
Marcus- Let's pull random quotes, shall we? "...Rumors of my deviation (or apostasy!) from libertarianism were much exaggerated."
The Guardian's oibit isnt random; and the reference was to extreme libertarianism.
David: You addressed your comment to John, who can answer for himself. But, I think you provide a false dichotomy when you ask which of these - 1 or 2 - John supports. What you say about them is correct, and John could agree. But, as an ethic an egoist doesn't say either 1 or 2 - he or she says there is nothing wrong with living a certain way - according to what he or she values. The claim is a moral one, not a factual one (1 and 2 are both factual claims - not moral ones. Moral claims typically involve "shoulds" or "should nots").
Still waiting on your ethical foundations. I hope that's not the paper you're writing!
SG
Stephen, I was hoping to have a sensible conversation about this. Apologies for sounding miffed, but your reply (though my comments were addressed to John) have irritated me by singularly missing my entire point. From his previous intelligent comments, I'm assuming that John will grasp the point.
The point is this. Psychological egoism can be stated, as a view, in one of a number of ways. I've offered two possible statements (which occur in the literature of that view) and have challenged both statements. The first, I claim is trivially true and is not the basis for a distinctive moral theory. The second is substantial but plainly false. So, if psychological egoism is to be taken seriously, I'm asking for a statement of the essential claim of the theory.
And, for your information, as I would hope was obvious to any reader, I am entirely aware of the distinction between a factual claim and a moral one. Here's a factual claim: Stephen G can't understand simple statements. Here's a moral claim: Stephen G ought to take an introductory course in philosophy.
David:
I completely understood your post. You asked John which of your two statements he supported. My point was that he could agree with you on both, and that your comments are irrelevant because we are talking about morality in this post.
Here's a factual claim: you simply refuse or can't provide your theory of ethics which has been requested several times.
Here's another factual claim: you can't understand the nature of a debate.
Here's another one, just to flog the goat a little bit more: you don't seem to be able to cope with dissent to your comments without lapsing into ad hominem.
Here's one last factual claim: I studied a lot of philosophy - religious and ethical - as part of my B.Th degree.
And here's a moral claim: I shouldn't deal with your ignorance any further.
Good day to you sir.
SG
I think you two have simply misunderstood each other.
David is asking for an adequate defence of psychological egoism (ie. that which makes the claim that humans DO act in their own self-interest all or most of the time).
Stephen is looking for agreement on ETHICAL egoism (ie. that which makes the claim that it is morally right to act in your own self-interest), or RATIONAL egoism (ie. that which makes the claim that it is rational to act in your own self-interest).
I think David's challenges to psychological egoism are worth considering. I think Stephen's point is also valid: what "does" is a distinct question from what "should". And there are various ways of approaching both.
Does that help get the conversation back on track? :-)
John:
There is only one thing that could get this topic back on track: for people to do as I have done and state what ethical theory they subscribe to, and why or how it yields the position they hold on animals - which, after all, was the original topic of the post.
SG
DAVID:
While you are still thinking of your ethical theory you should be aware of the following.
You accused me of being philosophically lacking and unable to understand basic statements. Lets analyse some of your statements in post 38, shall we?
You claim that
(1) We always act on our own desires
Is the same sort of statement as
(2) Water is H2O
Or
(3) All bachelors are unmarried men.
However, 1 is not the same kind of statement as 2 or 3 at all. 2 and 3 are true BY DEFINITION - in other words, if you understand the meanings of the words in the sentence you cannot fail to see that they are true.
(1) is NOT true by definition. In fact, although you claim it is trivially true - it might not even be true at all. There are many instances in which it is at least questionable whether we are acting out of our own desires. For instance: are people under hypnosis acting on their own desires? Are all the actions of people with tourettes syndrome on their desires? And what about our reflexes? Can they seriously be said to acts on our own desires? Surely not. That鈥檚 why we call them reflexes - they are involuntary. And can it be said that everything we might do in our sleep is an act on our own desires? These are just a few of the many examples on which (1) might not be true at all.
I could say a lot more about your other claim being clearly false, but perhaps you might need to catch your breath.
Still waiting on your ethical theory.
SG
I agree with Stephen here. In fact David your claim that (1) is trivially true just doesn't add up to a hill of beans. Even if the statement is obviously true - which Stephen has rightly questioned - we shouldn't say it is trivial. 1 + 1 = 2 is obviously true, but is it trivial? It's an incredibly important mathematical truth - despite seeming obvious or trivial. If we take (1) or even a modified version of (1) - perhaps which talks about morally significant acts, or conscious acts, or deliberate acts - we shoukd note that it would be a significant insight into human behaviour. It would also be of great importance to moral discussion. For example a utilitarian might say X is wrong because it leads to bad consequences. But, if some given person - S - doesn't desire to do X then what sense can we make of the notion that S SHOULD do X? Aren't we asking S to act in a way that nature seems to exclude him from acting - namely against his own desires?
David, you need to think a lot more. Quite frankly it seems to me that Stephen G is much more philosophically clued in than you.
And that's coming from a philosophy PhD candidate.
Pete.
Stephen - reply to 47.
I've read 38 - david doesn't say those statements are the same sort of statement, he says one is much like the other. Clearly they've lots in common in that they are both trivially true - at least I'd claim they are. You're right to point out a difference, in that the batchelors statement is what philosophers call an "analytically true" statement (true by the meaning of the words).
I do believe David's claim is correct that (1) is true (though in a trivial way). You give interesting examples of claims aimed at proving that (1) is not true. But your examples don't work, because "action" in the kinds of ethical and metaphysicial discussions we are having does not include non-intentional action. Yes, of course, people "act" under hypnosis, and they "act" as a result of a reflex result - but that's not the kind of action involved in the debate about human moral action.
I think David's statement (2) is false, and clearly so. You tease him with the suggestion that you can show that it is not false. I'd like to see that argument; genuinely, that would take quite an argument.
Incidendally, if David is still reading these comments (he sounded so "miffed" with some previous comments misunderstanding his position that he may have abandoned it!): I'm sure you know, David, that the problems you've outlined for egoism (and psychological and ethical egoism are related in important ways) have been debated and discussed in philosophy for some years. I'm impressed by your very succinct summary of the philosophical problem facing egoism as an approach to human moral action. You might have mentioned that the two-prong problem you outline is not original to you - those of us teaching courses in ethics lay out that problem every time we examine egoism in courses - but apart from your lapse in citation (!), I reckon your summary does justice to the kinds of issues those defending egoism need to resolve. I wouldn't give up on the possibility of a resolution, and of a a forceful defence of egoism; but those offering such a defence will need to deal with the classic dilemma outlined by David. This is a pretty heady blog, isn't it!? Thanks to Stephen and David for providing some interesting talking points here.
Oh - just out of interest. Vegetarianism. That subject seems to have been lost in the cut and thrust of the comments. I agree with whoever it was who argued that Singer's argument does not require one to be a utiliarian. Andrew Linzey, for example, is a Christian theologian who has written many books developing some of Singer's insights (check him out: he is a professor of theology at Oxford and has some interesting things to say).
A comment to Pete. The term "triviallt true" is a technical term within philosophy. It doesn't mean "obviously true". The term "vacuously true" is sometimes used as a synonym for "trivially true". If you google "trivially true", you'll find a vast library of philosophical articles explaining the term correctly. You can check out the "Vacuous Truth" article on wikipedia for a decent summary as well.
Given this technical interpretation of "trivially true" - which is plainly the sense involved in David's philosophical argument above - is it certainly no insult to a proposition to claim that it is trivially true. David's doesn't claim that 1+1=2 is trivially true. The examples he gives of trivial truth (the famous batchelors examples and the equally famous water is H2O example) are not controversial examples of trivially true statements.
I won't comment on the rest of your comment on David's points. Suffice to say, I don't think you've grasped the point he's making there. There are a number of treatments of the same puzzle he summarises here, as I sense he is aware, and you can find many discussions of that problem online.
Just a comment on the appearance of insults in these comments. I was attracted to the discussion because of my professional interests in action theory and ethical theories, and the web brought me to the discussion, but I'm surprised by the lack of good grace in some of the replies here. Philosophical dialogue is more informed and more successful for all when pettiness is set aside. I am pleased to see discussion of such fundamental questions on a blog site, but I appeal to everyone to express you views, and your challenges, with respect. After all, if we can't discuss ethics without respect, why bother? Apologies if that sounded a little patronising!
Now all we need is for someone to mention homosexuality and we'll have pb returning to write about his favourite obsession!
Yeah, where's PB?
Oh, sorry: 'Gays are great.' Cue PB.
OK鈥 few points:
David鈥檚 statement (1) was a universal claim - hence my critique of it. If you change it to something like 鈥渨e always act intentionally on our own desires鈥 then do we have a trivially true statement? I don鈥檛 think we do. Aristonk - don鈥檛 you see the difference between that sort of a statement and something like 鈥渁ll unmarried men are bachelors"? They are totally different and not alike in any way relevant to this discussion. One is trivially true - true by definition. Nothing of any interest comes from a statement like 鈥渁ll unmarried men are bachelors.鈥 But, is a statement like 鈥渨e always act intentionally on our own desires鈥 like that? Hardly. That鈥檚 a much more significant claim.
Pete brings up a point that everyone has so far ignored. I鈥檒l try to make it explicit with respect to ethics.
Lets say it is true that all of my intentional acts - or conscious acts - or morally significant acts - are acts of my own desire. Lets say further that this is true of every human being. If so then something like this would be true or at least probable: 鈥渉umans cannot intentionally act except on their own desires.鈥 I鈥檓 amazed that no one sees the significance of this - since we have so many people here claiming philosophical competence.
Take any given ethic - deontological ethics or utilitarian - whatever. Under utilitarianism we are told that X is wrong because it brings about something bad - suffering, say. However, lets say person Y says 鈥測ou should do X.鈥 Lets say further that I really desire not to do X. In what way are we to make sense of the moral claim that I am obliged in some way to do X? Am I obliged to do something contrary to my desires? If so and I succeed, wouldn鈥檛 that disprove the assertion that we always act on our desires? If I am not obliged to do something contrary to my desires then how can we make sense of the moral claims of utilitarians or deontologists or divine command ethicists when they tell us to do things contrary to our desires? If ought implies can then there are problems here, since you can't say I ought to do something if I can't actually do it.
So, isn鈥檛 the statement 鈥渨e always act intentionally on our own desires鈥 so much more than a trivially true statement? Technically speaking it isn鈥檛 trivially true at all, and ethically speaking it is far from being a trivial claim.
SG
PS...I'm stil waiting for anyone else to state their ethical position and why it yields the conclusions they defend regarding animals.
GAYS ARE GREAT!!
I love homosexuals!!
I'm actually a closet gay!
Didn't you all guess?
pb (prefers boys)
:)
In response to Aristonk's plea for respect. Fair enough. If I have offended anyone by any of my comments I apologise. Nature is red in tooth and claw, and unfortunately so are many debates in ethics.
Group hug.............
SG
Hi Stephen. Sorry to rush this reply; it's a little late ...
1. Let's not reduce the term "trivially true" to the claim "true by definition". Two different things for reasons we can explore if you like; though I'd just ask tou to follow up some of the available links online first. And analytic statements (e.g., all batchelors are unmarried men) may be very significant statement (as many philosophers from Kant through to Russell and Wittgenstein showed).
2. I take the statement "We always act on our own desires" as equivalent to this: "When we act (intentionally), our action in that respect is always accompanied by our desire to act in that way." That's the way that statement has been interpreted in the debate about egoism (because that statement is much discussed in the literature, as one possible way of stating a motivating claim underlying egoism).
Now, reflect further on that statement. Try to think of an intentional action X that is not accompanied by an corresponding desire to perform the action X,
One can think of lots of examples of the someone desiring to perform an action who is unable to perform the action. But are there examples of someone who chooses to perform an action X without also desiring to perform action X?
I claim there are no such examples. You argue that we should see this outcome as significant. Fair enough; it is significant. It is also a trivially true claim to the extent that one can determine the truth of the claim simply by reflecting on the meaning of the words "act" and "desire".
On your last point - an interesting point - about whether it makes sense for some ethicists "to do something contrary to our desires". This is a fascinating question which concentrated the minds of quite a few Greek philosophers. Here's how I read that moral imperative. I take that to mean: You currently do X (say, a sin), when you should do Y (say, an act of mercy); so I urge you to change your ways; but before you can change your ways, you need to change your desires so that you desire the Good, rather than that which falls short of the Good. In other words, I take the claim you're concerned about as a call to do something contrary to our CURRENT desires. There are no ethical or psychological difficulties in making that appeal.
Hope that's a least a coherent response to you interesting comments. Thanks for the dialogue.
Thanks for the group hug, Stephen G.
I haven't commented before this, but i've been reading others comments and find it frustrating when a potentially interesting debate gets side-tracked into childish cat-calling. There's more of a chance of focusing on the debate about ethics if people resist the temptation to be rude, patronising, or arrogant. That way spells doom for the debate, because then others just get shirty in reply and it spirals into childishness.
You're not the only offender here, Stephen - not by a long shot - but you can go back over your own comments and see where you've done this yourself.
The other reason why politeness assists intellectual discussion is this: I don't come to a discussion to be insulted or patronised. If I am insulted, I will walk away and not waste my time chatting to that person. Fewer people in a debate impoverishes the debate. I haven't seen a comment from David (Oxford) - I do hope he hasn't walked away from this debate. Your comments, David, have been extremely insightful, and the conversation here will be improved if you return.
With David's absence, Stephen's hug and Margaret's counseling, I thought I'd take the opportunity of you residents of the British Isles being asleep to offer this possible roadmap to solution of this debate (assuming all the key players are interested in doing so):
1) Stephen G: please define again the ethical theory of egoism to which you subscribe, and say again why you don't currently believe animals have rights under that theory.
2) David, or whoever else wishes to disagree with egoism, please give your own theory of ethics and say how it yields an opposite position on animals.
3) Stephen G, and/or other egoists, respond.
Let's go! Or this discussion is the IP equivalent of humping coconut trees.
Arisonk:
Thanks for your reply.
Let me point out that it doesn鈥檛 actually matter whether or not (1) is trivially true, obviously true, or true by definition. That鈥檚 not essential to my argument. The only important thing is that my critics here THINK it is true. And it is my contention that such a statement is as far from being insignificant as east is from west 鈥 contrary to David鈥檚 earlier comment that it didn鈥檛 amount to a hill of beans. Lets relate this abstract discussion to the current debate.
My critics hold some variation of:
(1) We always intentionally act on our own desires.
Let鈥檚 say I desire to kill and eat an animal. On what basis can you tell me it is immoral to do so? Let鈥檚 say you argue:
(2) You shouldn鈥檛 kill and eat an animal
Now, this is a moral statement 鈥 a claim that I ought or ought not do some given act.
Let鈥檚 say also that:
(3) Ought implies can (since it makes little sense to say someone ought to do something they can鈥檛 actually do).
From (1) it seems impossible for me to obey (2), and thus, given (3), it seems impossible for (2) to be a valid moral command or obligation.
Now, you try to get around this dilemma by saying I ought to change my desire. But, how does this solve the problem? All you have done is introduce another moral command (鈥測ou ought to change your desires with respect to killing and eating animals鈥). But, this command itself has no claim on me if I have no desire to change my desires with respect to killing and eating animals. On a slightly different point I鈥檓 not sure how one achieves the motivation or desire to change one鈥檚 desires 鈥 (since presumably we desire things we like and not desire things we don鈥檛 like)
The irony is, in an attempt to defeat my egoist ethic my opponents have seemingly provided me with a proposition on which it would seem difficult if not impossible to adhere to any other moral theory, since they would almost certainly involve that I do something I cannot do. Perhaps that鈥檚 why no one else seems willing to state their moral foundations as I have done.
SG