Judging the matter
Judge. The clue lies in the title. Deciding on matters of law in a court is a question of judgement.
As was previously said in respect of fingerprints, it is not an exact science.
There is no algebraic formula which tells a judge that (x + y)2 = 鈥渢he accused walks free鈥. It is a question of judgement.
Does that mean, then, that the prosecution, the Crown, is entitled to question the judgement reached by the bench if that forestalls a case from being put before a jury?
That is the essence of the controversy underlying the criticism delivered by the Lord Justice General, Lord Hamilton.
He has complained about the statement made to MSPs by the Lord Advocate, Elish Angiolini, with regard to the collapse of the World鈥檚 End murder trial.
To recap very briefly, Angus Sinclair was charged with the murders of two young women, 30 years ago.
The case was prosecuted by Alan Mackay, advocate depute.
The judge, Lord Clarke, dismissed the case on the basis of insufficient evidence 鈥 with the effect, of course, that the issue was not presented to the jury.
We are in novel territory here. The Lord Justice General鈥檚 statement was issued with an advisory note conceding that it was 鈥渁n unusual step鈥 for Scotland鈥檚 most senior judge.
A fortnight ago, in making her statement to MSPs, the Lord Advocate had acknowledged that she would 鈥渘ot normally think it appropriate as Lord Advocate to comment鈥 following a judgement from the bench.
In truth, she may be wishing now that she had pursued her customary course.
As I have said before, I was not in court for the trial and do not feel qualified to join the legion of 鈥渁rmchair commentators鈥, criticised by Ms Angiolini for offering views on the conduct of the prosecution.
However, I was in the gallery at Holyrood to hear the Lord Advocate鈥檚 statement.
I must confess to feeling a little uneasy: both at the exceptionally detailed statement itself and at the subsequent Q&A session with MSPs which seemed, to me, to come very close on occasion to rerunning the trial.
Did she criticise the judge? No, not directly. Indeed, she took pains to stress that the judge was perfectly entitled to act as he did. The decision was, properly, his and his alone.
Did she criticise the judgement?
Yes, at least implicitly. The key section is where she said: 鈥淚 am of the clear opinion that the evidence made available to the court was sufficient to be put before the jury, to allow them the opportunity to decide on the case against Angus Sinclair.鈥
The only interpretation which can be placed upon that statement is that the Lord Advocate felt the judge was wrong to halt the trial and wrong to forestall the jury from casting their verdict.
The Lord Justice General says that the Lord Advocate鈥檚 overall statement 鈥渄oes not afford the requisite respect鈥 to judges.
To the contrary, he argues, it may tend to undermine the necessary confidence in the judicial system.
At Holyrood today, the First Minister Alex Salmond defended the Lord Advocate鈥檚 statement, insisting that it was justifiable, indeed vital, in a system of Parliamentary accountability.
But, if that is true, then who speaks in Parliament for the defence? Who speaks for the judge? Are we only to hear the Crown view of cases which have caused public and political controversy?
I am far from offering a fixed view on this. The atmosphere surrounding these hideous murders perhaps called for comment. The Lord Advocate was undoubtedly responding to pressure from MSPs.
But might that not be said, in future, of other cases? Might it not be better, on balance, if prosecution, defence and judgement were conducted solely in court?
Might it not be better, again on balance, if MSPs confined themselves to setting the parameters for our judicial system including, if warranted, a Crown right to appeal against such judgements?
In short, might it not be better if our politicians stuck to making the law rather than prosecuting it?